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HOUSING INJUSTICE AND THE SUMMARY
EVICTION PROCESS: BEYOND LINDSEY v. NORMET
KATHRYN RAMSEY MASON*
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated an unprecedented level of
attention on one of the most pressing civil justice issues of our day:
evictions. Each year, millions of Americans are at risk of losing their
housing through dispossession and displacement. Despite decades of efforts
at all levels of government to improve and increase the supply of safe and
affordable housing, it remains unattainable to many, especially low-income
people of color. This Article argues that the legal process that governs
evictions, known as the summary eviction process, is the root of housing
insecurity. The summary eviction process prioritizes a landlord’s claim to
possession above all other considerations. The process significantly
curtails important aspects of the civil litigation process in favor of moving
cases quickly and efficiently through the court system, which benefits
landlords to the detriment of tenants. Every state utilizes the summary
eviction process, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in
the 1972 case of Lindsey v. Normet. The Article closely examines the
Lindsey decision, challenging much of the Court’s legal reasoning and its
underlying assumptions about eviction and the realities of the landlordtenant relationship. The Article argues that the Lindsey decision has
hampered meaningful reform of the inherent inequities in the landlordtenant relationship and further entrenched the devastating individual,
social, and racial justice consequences of eviction, which begin, but do not
end, in the courtroom. The Article also identifies serious legal issues raised
by the summary eviction process and suggests that states need to consider
significant reforms of the eviction process itself to address these
imbalances.

* Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Medical-Legal Partnership Clinic,
University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. Excellent research assistance
was provided by Sierra Knight and Jake Taylor. The author wishes to thank Alex Bissell,
Amy Campbell, Michelle Ewert, Tim Ramsey, Danny Schaffzin, and the participants of the
Poverty Law Workshop and the Clinical Writers’ Workshop.
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Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic that began in March 2020 has brought with it
the threat of an eviction and homelessness crisis in the United States
approaching the scale of the Great Depression. 1 The pandemic wreaked
havoc on the American economy. State and local economies shut down,
reopened, then shut down once again in the face of virus outbreak surges.
The social distancing measures that the CDC and state and local
governments recommended and enforced to contain the health effects of the
virus compounded the economic toll.2 Tens of millions of people lost their
jobs and income. 3 As the pandemic unfolded, the media focused on an issue
that has plagued low-income Americans for decades: evictions. 4 While
COVID-19 brought new attention to evictions, the problem of eviction and
its effects on housing insecurity and neighborhood instability has been a
pervasive and persistent toxin in the fight against poverty and inequality. 5
1. Analysis on Unemployment Projects 40-45% Increase in Homelessness This Year,
CMTY. SOLS. (May 11, 2020), https://community.solutions/analysis-on-unemploymentprojects-40-45-increase-in-homelessness-this-year/.
2. See, e.g., Pallavi Gogoi, You’re Not Welcome Here: How Social Distancing Can
Destroy the Global Economy, NPR (Oct. 26, 2020, 2:03 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2020/10/26/927064268/youre-not-welcome-here-how-social-distancing-can-destroy-theglobal-economy.
3. In July of 2020, 16.9 million people faced unemployment in the United States, with
9.6 million of those unemployed attributing their loss of work to the pandemic. Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.
gov/cps/effects-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic.htm (Nov. 10, 2021). An additional
31.3 million people reported that they had been unable to work at some point within four
weeks prior to survey, due to pandemic-related closures or loss of business. Id.
4. See, e.g., Katy O’Donnell, Black Community Braces for Next Threat: Mass
Evictions, POLITICO (June 12, 2020, 4:30 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/
06/12/mass-evictions-314699; Grace Himmelstein & Matthew Desmond, Eviction and
Health: A Vicious Cycle Exacerbated by a Pandemic, HEALTH AFFS. (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20210315.747908/full/ (“The adverse health
effects of housing insecurity were evident before the emergence of COVID-19, but the
pandemic-induced financial crisis for low- and middle-income households has increased
housing precarity and related health risks.”); Erika Rickard & Qudsiya Naqui, National and
State Efforts Continue to Prevent Pandemic-Related Evictions, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June
9, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2021/06/09/nationaland-state-efforts-continue-to-prevent-pandemic-related-evictions.
5. Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 88, 89 (2012) (“Increased residential mobility is associated with a host of
negative outcomes, including higher rates of adolescent violence, poor school performance,
health risks, psychological costs, and the loss of neighborhood ties.” (citations omitted)).
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Decades of reform efforts at all levels of government have failed to
significantly alleviate the lack of affordable and decent housing. Segregated
neighborhoods continue to pervade cities, and high levels of residential
mobility and displacement persist, especially for low-income tenants of
color. This Article contends that a root cause of all these issues is the ease
and speed with which property owners can displace residential tenants
through the summary eviction process. The summary eviction process is a
holdover from land disputes under English common law that made its way
to the United States and has been adopted by every state.6 Designed to
provide a quick and efficient judicial alternative to landlord self-help, this
process prioritizes the landlord’s claim to possession above all other
considerations.7 To accomplish the goal of moving cases quickly through
the court system, traditional aspects of civil litigation are cut out of the
process. While the specifics vary by state, summary eviction proceedings
typically move quickly from complaint to trial and have significant
limitations on defenses, counterclaims, discovery, and motion practice. 8
It has been fifty years since there was a serious legal challenge to the
summary eviction process. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Lindsey v. Normet, in which a group of tenants in Portland, Oregon,
challenged Oregon’s summary eviction statute on due process and equal
protection grounds.9 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
summary eviction process.10 The Lindsey decision came amid a wave of
social and legal reforms that were intended to address issues of social,
racial, and economic injustice in American society. 11 These included the
Civil Rights Movement, the implementation of social safety net programs
like food stamps and Medicaid, and some movement toward expanded
6. See Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction
and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 137, 139–52, 156 (2000).
7. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.C. L. REV. 503, 512 (1982).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 58 (1972).
10. Id. at 64, 69. The Lindsey decision is also frequently cited for its holding that there
is no constitutional right to housing. See id. at 74 (“[T]he Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that
document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . . . .
Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of
landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”).
11. See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
CAL. L. REV. 389, 392–93 (2011).
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tenants’ rights.12 There were many gains, both in legislatures and in courts,
including prohibitions against many forms of discrimination 13 and the
recognition of the right of children to have an education. 14 One glaring
omission, however, was a correction of the power imbalance in the
landlord-tenant relationship. The summary eviction process is the
embodiment of that imbalance, and neither legislatures nor courts have
meaningfully addressed the legal process itself within the past fifty years,
leaving firmly in place an antiquated and lopsided system. It prevents the
true, meaningful reform that would result in improvements for both tenants
and landlords.
While there have been some positive tenants’ rights developments by
states before and since the Lindsey decision, 15 the summary eviction process
remains a significant impediment to additional reforms and to meaningful
progress on housing justice. Successfully addressing issues of housing
affordability and ongoing residential segregation requires confronting the
issues of legal and illegal, formal and informal, displacement of lowincome tenants through eviction. Scholars have acknowledged that the
results of some of the most important reforms brought about by the tenants’
rights revolution “have been far from what their advocates predicted.”16 An
overlooked but fundamental reason for the lack of reforms is the summary
process itself. The Supreme Court’s Lindsey decision paved the way for
decades of stunted efforts at addressing problems of housing segregation,
equity, and affordability. For years, scholars considered eviction to be an
inevitable consequence of poverty resulting from falling behind on one’s
rent or from crime, illegal drugs, or domestic violence. 17 Research by social
scientists such as Matthew Desmond has shown that eviction is not just a
12. See id. at 391.
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the use
of separate school facilities for children of different races was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, 78 Stat. 241 (outlawing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national
origin in voting, schools and public accommodations, and employment).
14. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding that a Texas law denying children
of undocumented immigrants the right to attend public schools was in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See Super, supra note 11, at 392–93.
16. Id. at 394. Super argues that there are a number of reasons, correlating with the
failures of the welfare rights revolution, that the tenants’ rights revolution has not been as
successful as its champions predicted. Id. at 394–97.
17. See Desmond, supra note 5, at 89–90.
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result of poverty; it is, in fact, a driver of deepening poverty and
neighborhood instability. 18 Eviction is also a racial and socioeconomic
divider in the United States; residential renters have significantly fewer
rights with regard to their constitutionally protected interests in their homes
than homeowners do, and the households for people of color are more
likely to be rented than White households. 19 This means that most people
who are evicted or threatened with eviction are more likely to be Black or
brown. 20 In fact, the group with the highest risk of eviction is Black women
with children.21 A move toward greater social and racial justice requires
addressing the systemic injustices in the eviction legal system.
To make meaningful progress toward housing justice, the summary
eviction process must be analyzed, challenged, and reformed by state
governments. A key piece of that is a reexamination of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lindsey and an analysis of how the same assumptions about the
landlord-tenant relationship that the Court made in Lindsey have continued
to stunt many meaningful developments in tenants’ rights. Legislative
reform, rather than litigation, is necessary and must happen at the state
level; legislatures and courts must understand and address the ways in
which the summary eviction process perpetuates long-standing imbalances
in the landlord-tenant relationship that continue to hinder progress in
achieving housing justice. Part I of this Article describes the history and
development of the summary eviction process, beginning in common law
England and discussing its migration to, and development in, the United
States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Part II details ways in
which the landlord-tenant relationship has undergone some reform at the
state level before and since Lindsey and describes some advancements of
the tenants’ rights revolution, including codification of the implied warranty
of habitability and protections against retaliatory eviction. This Part,
however, suggests that these reforms have never reached their full potential
and argues that states’ continued reliance on the summary eviction process,
authorized by the Lindsey decision, is a primary driver of this dynamic. Part
III closely examines the Lindsey case and provides a detailed analysis of the
18. Id. at 91.
19. Based on data from the 2019 U.S. Census, 58% of Black American households and
53% of Hispanic households are rented, while less than 31% of White households are rented.
Who Are the Renters in America, USAFACTS, https://usafacts.org/articles/who-is-renting-inamerica-cares-act/ (Feb. 25, 2021, 12:56 PM PST).
20. See Desmond, supra note 5, at 102–04.
21. Id. at 102.
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Supreme Court’s decision, identifying the problematic legal reasoning and
assumptions the Court made about the landlord-tenant relationship and the
tenants’ rights at stake. Part IV argues that even with positive reforms that
states have made since the 1960s, empirical data and evolving notions of
racial and social justice demonstrate that the progress is insufficient,
necessitating the dismantling of the summary eviction process by state
legislatures and courts. Part V suggests specific reforms that state
governments should consider when seeking to advance housing equity and
justice through changes to the summary eviction process.
I. Early Development of the Summary Eviction Process in the United States
A review of the history of the summary eviction process is necessary to
understand why the process is out of step with modern conceptions of
justice and equity and how the summary eviction process came to occupy a
place of primacy in the laws that govern residential tenancies. Modern
American landlord-tenant law has been called a “hybrid” of different areas
of law.22 It mixes property law, contracts law, and, increasingly, consumerlaw principles. 23 Because landlord-tenant law is not situated squarely in one
particular area, courts and scholars have prioritized one or more of these
areas over the others, leading to a mishmash of statutes and judicial
decisions that can vary greatly between jurisdictions. 24 This Part discusses
the roots of the summary eviction process in English common law and
examines how many of those principles have been adopted in the United
States.
The summary eviction process in the United States is traceable to
English laws governing the landlord-tenant relationship and repossession of
22. Glendon, supra note 7, at 505. Glendon asserts that the “history [of landlord-tenant
law] is that of a hybrid legal institution, neither entirely contractual nor entirely proprietary.”
Id.
23. See Spector, supra note 6, at 179–94 (discussing ways in which federal consumer
protection laws apply to the landlord-tenant relationship).
24. See Glendon, supra note 7, at 521–28; Spector, supra note 6, at 195–97 (discussing
differences among lease forms in different states). Additionally, some states treat the
covenants of the landlord and tenant as mutually dependent, while others treat them as
independent. For example, at the time of the Lindsey v. Normet decision in 1972, Oregon
treated the covenant of the tenant to pay rent and the covenant of the landlord to maintain the
property as independent obligations, meaning that “[t]he practical effect of Lindsey . . .
would be that a tenant in default in his rental obligation could be permitted to raise a
habitability defense in an action for rent but denied this opportunity in an action for
possession only.” Glendon, supra note 7, at 537.
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property. The notion of possession of real property is deeply rooted in
ancient conceptions of social hierarchy. 25 In common law England, a
person—at that time, nearly always a man—asserting possession of land
might trace his ownership to the Norman Conquest of 1066, thereby
establishing his social status.26 Eventually, around the beginning of the
sixteenth century, royal courts in England came to recognize a tenant’s
possessory interest in a piece of real property, yet the tenant’s interest was
always subjugated to the landlord’s greater ownership interest. 27 The status
conferred upon landowners and the prioritization of their possessory
interests have dominated the landowner-lessee relationship ever since. 28
The problem of a person not entitled to possession attempting to gain or
hold possession inevitably led to the question of who was entitled to
possession of a piece of property. The early laws that governed who should
possess a piece of property were grounded in the criminal law of trespass
and provided penalties of imprisonment for people who violated them. 29
These statutes also allowed landlords who were parties to possession
disputes to engage in their own extrajudicial methods to recover
possession—otherwise known as self-help.30 Landlords were often allowed
to engage in actions like “seiz[ing] a tenant’s personal property to satisfy
the overdue rent or simply using self-help eviction to expel tenants from the
leased premises.”31 Conversely, tenants “enjoyed absolutely no self-help
remedies and had very few judicial remedies for the wrongful actions of
their landlords.”32

25. Spector, supra note 6, at 141–43.
26. Id. at 141.
27. Id. at 149–50 (“[R]ecognition of the tenant’s interest as a real property interest did
not mean that the tenant enjoyed all of the benefits that landownership conferred on the
landlord. . . . [W]hatever new rights the new status conferred on the tenant for years—e.g.,
ability to petition courts—those rights were subject to interpretation in a legal framework
that had been designed to protect persons with greater status and rights by restoring
possession to freeholders, and treating all non-possessory issues as secondary.”).
28. See id. at 150–53 (tracing the relationship between English conceptions of landlord
status to the development of American landlord-tenant law).
29. See id. at 150–52; see also Soffer v. Beech, 409 A.2d 337, 340 (Pa. 1979).
30. Spector, supra note 6, at 150–51 (“Such methods might include locking the tenant
out of the premises or seizing the tenant’s property until back rent was paid.”).
31. Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and
Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 937 (1984).
32. Id.
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Prior to the development of the summary eviction process, a landlord’s
judicial remedy for recovering possession of property lay mainly in the
form of an ejectment action.33 These types of cases, however, tended to be
“fraught with procedural complexities and delays,” and it was not unusual
for landlords to forego that process altogether in favor of self-help.34 The
summary eviction process was intended to provide a quick and efficient
judicial remedy that was an alternative to landlord self-help.35
The history of forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) actions began in
England with the Forcible Entry Act of 1381,36 with revisions in 1391,
1402, 1429, and 1623.37 FED laws also emerged in colonial America;
Massachusetts passed a version of an FED law as early as 1671.38 Other
states with early FED statutes include Maryland in 1793, Pennsylvania in
1772, Ohio in 1795, Texas in 1840, Washington in 1854,39 North Carolina
in 1854, and Tennessee in 1821.40 The first reference to a “summary
proceeding” as it relates to FED statutes was in New York in 1820. 41 In the
early twentieth century, courts recognized that “[o]riginally the statute was
confined to cases of forcible entry and detainer, and to cases where the
strictly conventional relation of landlord and tenant, created by agreement,
existed between the parties.”42 American courts and legislatures necessarily
began to develop landlord-tenant law when industrialization and waves of
immigration resulted in higher concentration of urban tenants, many lowincome, in larger cities across the country. 43 In 1879, Tennessee removed
the requirement for a jury trial in its FED statute, which is still in effect in
Tennessee General Sessions Courts today. 44 North Carolina, however, did
33. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6:10, at 409
(1980).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Jean Pierre Nogues Jr., Comment, Defects in the Current Forcible Entry and
Detainer Laws of the United States and England, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1070 n.13 (1978).
37. Id. at 1070 n.14.
38. Page v. Dwight, 48 N.E. 850, 851 (Mass. 1897).
39. Spector, supra note 6, at 152 nn.55–56.
40. Robert Larry Brown, Note, Right to a Jury Trial in Forcible Entry and Detainer
Actions in General Sessions Courts in Tennessee, 6 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 59, 62 (1975).
41. See Stephen Ross, Converting Nonpayment to Holdover Summary Proceedings: The
New York Experience with Conditional Limitations Based upon Nonpayment of Rent, 15
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 289, 295 (1987).
42. Reich v. Cochran, 94 N.E. 1080, 1081 (N.Y. 1911).
43. Glendon, supra note 7, at 510.
44. Brown, supra note 40, at 62–63.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/5

2022]

HOUSING INJUSTICE & SUMMARY EVICTION

399

not remove the right to a jury trial until 1971, although the 1869 statute
contained amendments titled “summary ejectment.” 45 Wisconsin appears to
have updated its statute to include a process that resembles summary
eviction effective in 1971.46
As the summary process developed, it “[p]rimarily . . . benefited
landlords by giving them an alternative to the time-consuming and
expensive action of ejectment.”47 State legislatures also intended to provide
some protection to tenants against forcible removal from the property they
were renting and to protect public peace by deterring violence that might
result from landlord self-help.48 However, the summary process in most
states did not provide mechanisms for tenants to assert defenses like the
habitability of the premises. 49 This was partially due to the move toward
urbanization and the lack of written leases for residential tenancies in urban
areas.50 By the end of the nineteenth century, leases began to look less like
traditional conveyances of land and more like contracts, especially in the
context of commercial land transactions. 51 “The written lease, especially in
commercial contexts, became longer . . . [and contained] sets of mutual
promises in which the parties provided for contingencies and otherwise
worked out the details of what was to be a continuing relationship.”52
While this development certainly influenced landlord-tenant law as a
whole, urban residential lease arrangements were increasingly periodic
tenancies without written leases. 53 It was not until the mid-twentieth century
that significant reforms that would benefit lower-income, urban tenants
gained traction. Part II discusses these developments.

45. Id. at 62.
46. Robert F. Boden, 1971 Revision of Eviction Practice in Wisconsin, 54 MARQ. L.
REV. 298, 299 (1971).
47. Glendon, supra note 7, at 512.
48. See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 33, § 6:10, at 409.
49. See Glendon, supra note 7, at 533, 537.
50. See id. at 508–09.
51. Id. at 508.
52. Id.
53. Id. As a result, “[t]he economic circumstances of urban residential tenants . . .
militated against the use of written leases. The periodic tenancy was barely visible in the
case law and legal literature.” Id. at 508–09. The consequence of this absence from “case
law and legal literature” was that there was relatively little development or scholarly scrutiny
of residential landlord-tenant law, to the detriment of low-income tenants. See generally id.
at 509.
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II. Landlord-Tenant Law Developments Before and Since Lindsey
The Supreme Court decided Lindsey v. Normet during the height of the
tenants’ rights revolution. The Court’s decision, however, did not entirely
halt state-level efforts to provide greater protections to residential tenants.
In the past fifty years, some states have made important and meaningful
changes to landlord-tenant law, while others have made minimal reforms. 54
This has resulted in significant variations between jurisdictions regarding
tenants’ rights and the eviction process. This Part details some of the gains
made in this area since the 1960s and 1970s while emphasizing that these
gains have been piecemeal and incomplete.
A. The Tenants’ Rights Revolution
The tenants’ rights revolution was a series of judicial and statutory
reforms of residential landlord-tenant law that occurred across the country
primarily between 1968 and 1973.55 These reforms largely benefited tenants
in relation to landlords. 56 Beginning in the early 1960s, courts began to shift
how they conceptualized tenants’ rights in residential rental housing and to
move away from the “classical” conception of landlord-tenant law. 57 The
so-called tenants’ rights revolution that followed resulted in some apparent
gains for tenant protection, as tenants’ advocates tried to address some of
the most egregious imbalances in the landlord-tenant relationship. 58 The
revolution sought to address several different aspects of the landlord-tenant
relationship, including the implied warranty of habitability, expansion of
rent control measures, security of tenancy at the expiration of a lease, and
limitations on a landlord’s ability to retaliate against a tenant for asserting
her rights under the law, among others. 59 Despite the revolution’s noble
goals and mentionable successes, half a century later, it is clear that a
fundamental restructuring of the landlord-tenant relationship has not come

54. See id. at 521–28 (identifying shifts in landlord-tenant law beginning in the mid1960s).
55. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 521 (1984).
56. Id.
57. See Glendon, supra note 7, at 520, 522–23.
58. See Super, supra note 11, at 391.
59. See Rabin, supra note 55, at 520–40.
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to pass.60
The tenants’ rights revolution had its roots in the social, racial, and
economic justice movements of the 1960s.61 The Civil Rights Movement
played a major role in raising awareness of—and outrage about—
previously tolerated social conditions. 62 Moreover, two presidential
commissions under President Lyndon Johnson, the Douglas Commission
and the Kaiser Committee, recommended the development of millions of
units of new low-income housing. 63 In 1968, both had found a serious lack
of quality affordable housing across the country, especially in urban
centers.64 These developments unquestionably influenced judges who were
adjudicating legal challenges by tenants dissatisfied with the landlordtenant relationship.65 Professor David Super describes five principles that
motivated judges and legislatures toward reform during the tenants’ rights
revolution: first, the desire to modernize the landlord-tenant relationship
and frame it in terms of contract law instead of property law; second, the
goal of ameliorating poor conditions in rental housing; third, the attempt to
redistribute the wealth of landlords to their poorer tenants; fourth, the
“humanitarian” goal of providing a “better life” for poor tenants; and fifth,
providing “social stability” during the turbulent 1960s.66
One way courts contributed to the tenants’ rights revolution was to
challenge the primacy of landowners’ rights, once a fundamental principle
of property law, by instead imposing the more equitable frame of contract
law, in which both parties to a contract are responsible for their obligations
and breaches. 67 While this reframing of the landlord-tenant relationship
60. See, e.g., Super, supra note 11, at 423 (noting “extremely low rates of success for
tenants with meritorious claims under the implied warranty of habitability,” notwithstanding
attempted landlord-tenant law reform).
61. Rabin, supra note 55, at 546–49.
62. See id. at 546–47.
63. Id. at 543–45.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 545. In a letter to Professor Rabin in 1982, Judge J. Skelly Wright, who sat on
the D.C. Circuit and wrote the 1970 decision in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., one of
the most prominent implied warranty of habitability cases, acknowledged that his decision in
Javins was influenced by the social change and unrest of the 1960s. Id. at 548–49. He wrote,
“I offer no apology for not following more closely the legal precedents which had
cooperated in creating the conditions that I found unjust.” Id.
66. Super, supra note 11, at 400–04.
67. Rabin, supra note 55, at 521. “Traditionally, courts considered the landlord’s rights
to determine the amount of rent, to gain possession at the end of the term, and to choose
tenants, and the right of the parties to decide on the extent of landlord services as basic rights
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should have meant that the two parties to a lease contract would be treated
more equitably, the continued prioritization of the landlord’s right to
possession as the primary issue in eviction cases precluded equitable
treatment. Ultimately, the two main developments that emerged from the
tenants’ rights revolution were the recognition and codification of the
implied warranty of habitability, as well as protections against retaliation by
property owners toward tenants asserting their rights.
B. Codification of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
The implied and codified warranty of habitability has long been hailed as
one of the great successes of the tenants’ rights revolution. 68 Prior to the
mid-twentieth century, the prevailing legal doctrine had been that of
independent covenants between landlord and tenant; neither party’s
obligation was dependent on the other’s performance.69 A precursor to the
statutory warranty of habitability was the doctrine of constructive eviction,
which allowed a tenant to terminate a lease agreement if a landlord failed to
perform necessary repairs.70 However, by the time courts began to seriously
consider expansion of the doctrine of constructive eviction in the midtwentieth century, the emphasis on the warranty of habitability brought by
the tenants’ rights revolution made expanding constructive eviction
unnecessary.71 The origins of the statutory warranty of habitability in the
United States is traceable to municipal building codes, which municipalities
began to implement in the early twentieth century. 72 Building codes became
ubiquitous by the end of the 1960s, due in large part to the federal
government linking funds to the adoption of building codes. 73 Beginning in
that rested on fundamental legal principles.” Id.; see also Super, supra note 11, at 400–01.
“Some courts and legislatures sought to explain the implied warranty of habitability, and the
process of treating it as mutual with the tenant’s duty to pay rent, as harmonizing landlordtenant law with broader principles of contract law.” Id. at 400.
68. Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87
U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 148 (2020).
69. See id. at 154.
70. See Glendon, supra note 7, at 512–13. “As courts [in the nineteenth century] began
to routinely permit ‘constructive eviction’ to serve as a remedy for a landlord’s breach of
covenants in the lease, the legal fiction became a functional substitute for the missing
doctrine of mutually dependent covenants.” Id. at 513.
71. Id. at 514.
72. See generally Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution:
Observations on the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 793,
800 (2013) (noting New York City enacted the first local building code in 1901).
73. See Rabin, supra note 55, at 551–52.
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1954, municipalities were required to adopt building codes in order to
receive “federal urban renewal funds and other forms of federal
assistance.”74 As building codes proliferated, and with them, litigation,
many state courts started allowing negligence tort claims against landlords
who violated the codes. 75
Beginning with Pines v. Perssion, decided by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in 1961, courts have articulated an interdependency between the
obligations of the landlord and the tenant. 76 In 1970, Judge J. Skelly Wright
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals authored the opinion
in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., in which he articulated a very
strong relationship between the tenant’s obligation to pay rent and the
landlord’s obligation to maintain the premises. 77 In the wake of Javins,
there was hope that the tenants’ rights revolution would equalize the
landlord-tenant relationship and result in permanent social changes. 78
Tenants’ advocates hailed the warranty of habitability as a welcome
counterbalance to the ease with which courts had allowed landlords to
displace tenants through the eviction process.79 Yet, in reality, it has offered
limited victories on those fronts.80
Despite this radical revision of firmly rooted legal doctrines, the
warranty of habitability has not yielded the hoped-for results of
incentivizing landlords to improve maintenance of rental housing units and
empowering tenants to assert their legal rights. Instead, “[t]he most
prominent result of the [tenants’ rights] revolution . . . was reading an
implied warranty of habitability into residential leases, with a corollary
74. Glendon, supra note 7, at 519.
75. Id. at 520.
76. See Rabin, supra note 55, at 552; Glendon, supra note 7, at 525; Super, supra note
11, at 394, 404.
77. 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. See Super, supra note 11, at 399.
79. See Super, supra note 11, at 401.
The courts had long provided landlords with a service essential to their
businesses: eviction procedures, operating far more expeditiously than other
civil actions, allowed landlords quickly and inexpensively to coerce and
remove any tenants not paying rent. The courts would now demand that, in
exchange for this extraordinary help in requiring tenants to perform their legal
obligations, landlords comply with the laws on health and safety.
Id.
80. One study of 2016 data from New York City found that fewer than 2% of tenants
who had meritorious claims of habitability concerns actually received rent abatements in
compensation. Summers, supra note 68, at 190.
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prohibition on evictions in retaliation for asserting these new rights.”81 The
first appellate court in the country to recognize the implied warranty of
habitability was the 1961 Supreme Court of Wisconsin case of Pines v.
Perssion.82 It was followed in 1970 by Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., widely regarded as one of the pivotal decisions on the warranty of
habitability.83 There, the court held that leases should be construed as
contracts and that, as typical in contract law, the mutual dependency of the
parties’ covenants should apply. 84
C. Protections Against Retaliation
One of the other important advancements of the tenants’ rights
revolution was the establishment of protection for tenants against retaliatory
eviction by landlords. This protection went hand-in-hand with the warranty
of habitability because it prevented landlords from evicting tenants who
asserted their rights under the warranty of habitability. 85
D. Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
In addition to the gains of the tenants’ rights revolution, there have been
other important landlord-tenant law developments since the Lindsey
decision. In 1972, the same year as the Lindsey decision, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the
Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act.86 While this was certainly a
significant gain for tenant protection, it did not protect tenants in all states
from eviction for nonpayment of rent because only certain states allow

81. Super, supra note 11, at 393.
82. 111 N.W.2d 409, 412–13 (Wis. 1961); see also Dale A. Whitman, Fifty Years of
Landlord-Tenant Law: A Perspective, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 785, 785 (2013).
83. 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
84. Id. at 1081–82; see also Rabin, supra note 55, at 524. Javins is famous for Judge J.
Skelly Wright’s statement that “[w]hen American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek
‘shelter’ today, they seek a well known package of goods and services—a package which
includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper
maintenance.” 428 F.2d at 1074.
85. Super, supra note 11, at 393.
86. Ashby Richbourg Scott, The Tennessee Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act—“A Hodge-Podge of Statutory Exclusions,” 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 903, 911 (2004).
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tenants to seek rent abatements to offset a nonpayment claim due to a
landlord’s failure to maintain the premises. 87
III. Lindsey v. Normet: Judicial Impediment to Equalizing the LandlordTenant Relationship
Despite the legislative and judicial gains of the tenants’ rights revolution,
both the summary process of evictions and the ongoing prioritization of the
landlord’s right to possession over all other considerations in the landlordtenant relationship have limited the continued development of landlordtenant law. This limitation is due in large part to the Supreme Court’s 1972
decision in Lindsey v. Normet.
A. Underlying Facts and the District Court Decision
Decided by the Supreme Court in 1972, Lindsey v. Normet88 was a class
action brought by a group of tenants in Portland, Oregon, who were seeking
a declaratory injunction against Oregon’s FED statute.89 The tenants
claimed that the FED statute violated their constitutional rights of due
process and equal protection under the law. 90 The tenants were all low
income and living in substandard housing conditions.91 They had asked
their landlords to make repairs, and the landlords refused. 92 The tenants
then decided to withhold rent in an effort to obtain the repairs, and the
landlords threatened to evict them for nonpayment of rent. 93 Before the
landlords could actually file eviction papers, the tenants went to court
seeking to enjoin the landlords from doing so. 94
The plaintiff-tenants asserted eight causes of action in their complaint, all
based in either due process or equal protection. 95 The three-judge district

87. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-502 (West 1975); Super, supra note 11, at 394
(explaining that, while many states took the approach of making the implied warranty of
habitability and the landlord’s obligation to make repairs “mutual with the tenant’s covenant
to pay rent,” not all states have done so).
88. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
89. Lindsey v. Normet, 341 F. Supp. 638, 639 (D. Or. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
405 U.S. 56 (1972).
90. Id. at 641.
91. Id. at 639.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 640.
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court panel ruled against the plaintiff-tenants on all their claims.96 The court
did not discuss all the causes of action in detail, but it broke down the
allegations in the complaint into five categories. 97 It first discussed the due
process and equal protection challenges to the notice requirements of the
Oregon FED statute.98 The plaintiffs alleged that due process was not
satisfied because the FED statute only required an eviction complaint to
state the names of the landlord and tenant, the address of the premises, and
that an FED action was initiated, but not the grounds on which it was
based. 99 The plaintiffs also asserted that the notice requirements violated
equal protection because “defendants are in greater need of information
than are plaintiffs.”100 The district court dismissed both allegations, stating,
“[T]he usual F.E.D. case is one in which the tenant, like a taxpayer, knows
whether or not he has paid, how much he has paid, and, if he has not paid,
why he does not think he should pay. Detailed notice in such cases tends to
elevate form over substance.”101
The second category of the plaintiffs’ “attack” against the Oregon FED
statute concerned the quick turnaround from complaint to trial, which the
tenants asserted was unreasonably short.102 Oregon’s statute allowed courts
to schedule an eviction trial as soon as two to four days after the complaint
was served, including weekends.103 Again, the court showed a complete
lack of understanding of the tenants’ realities in its justification for why the
tenants did not require any additional time: “As noted above, a tenant
knows in most cases whether or not he has paid his rent, and, if not, why
not. The tenant would not be any the wiser if the law were to be rewritten to
give him ten days’ notice.”104 With this statement, the court conflated notice
to the tenant with the tenant’s ability to adequately prepare for the hearing
96. Id. at 642.
97. Id. at 641–42.
98. Id. at 641.
99. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 10, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
(No. 70-5045).
100. Lindsey, 341 F. Supp. at 641.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court’s use of the word “attack” is consistent with the disregard of the
tenants’ rights by the three-judge panel.
103. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (No. 70-5045). The tenants’
attorney stated that a tenant could be served with a complaint on a Friday and expected to go
to trial on Monday or Tuesday. At most, the tenant would be entitled to an additional twoday adjournment, at the discretion of the court. Id.
104. Lindsey, 341 F. Supp. at 641.
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and erroneously assumed the simplicity of the issues that nonpayment
eviction cases present. The more advance notice that tenants have, the more
likely they will be able to secure legal counsel, especially if they need to
rely on oversubscribed legal aid offices.105 The solution does not lie in a
tenant getting ten days’ notice versus four days’ notice; rather, the
extremely short time frame makes it effectively impossible for tenants to
secure counsel and to understand their rights.
The third category the court discussed related to Oregon’s requirement
that, should a tenant seek a continuance of the case and wish to remain in
the leased premises, the tenant must post a cash security for the amount of
rent due during that entire time period. 106 The tenants asserted that this
requirement violated due process because it denied access to a continuance
for poor tenants who could not afford to post the cash. 107 The district court
dismissed this allegation, stating that “[i]t is . . . not unreasonable to require
that a person whose eviction is sought for nonpayment of rent post security
for the rent if he wishes to litigate the duty to pay.” 108 While this statement
is not objectively unreasonable, the court failed to consider that Oregon
required the tenant to post multiple months of rent payments in advance to
obtain a continuance of longer than one month—an insurmountable barrier
to many poor tenants.109
The fourth category of the plaintiffs’ allegations concerned the Oregon
FED statute’s limitations on the defenses that a tenant could raise in an
eviction proceeding. 110 Here, the court focused on the Oregon legislature’s
distinction between the covenants of the landlord and the tenant. 111
According to the court, allowing the landlord to retake possession of the
property during the appeals process was not “so clearly unreasonable as to
render the statute unconstitutional.” 112 However, the court failed to consider
105. According to the Legal Services Corporation, in 2017, federally funded legal aid
offices received 1.7 million requests for civil legal assistance, including for housing matters,
but had to refuse more than half of those requests “due to a lack of resources.” LEGAL SERVS.
CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://lsc-live.app.box.com/s/6x4wbh5d2gqxwy0v094os1x2k6a39q
74.
106. Lindsey, 341 F. Supp. at 641.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (No. 70-5045).
110. Lindsey, 341 F. Supp. at 642.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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the realities of what it would mean to disrupt the status quo by
dispossessing the tenant during ongoing litigation.
The final category of the plaintiff-tenants’ allegations that the district
court considered related to the requirements for tenants seeking to appeal
eviction judgments.113 Oregon’s FED statute required that a tenant who lost
possession of the premises after trial needed to “post a bond for double the
amount of rent that [would] accrue pending the appeal.” 114 The Oregon
Supreme Court had already ruled on the constitutionality of this provision
in Scales v. Spencer.115 The district court reiterated the reasoning from
Scales, stating that “without a provision for some reasonable measure of
liquidated damages (the doubled rent pending appeal), every ousted tenant
would appeal, secure in the knowledge that he had nothing to lose
thereby.”116 Despite the ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court and the
decision of the district court, this was the only holding that the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately overturned.117
B. The Supreme Court Decision
After the district court’s ruling, the tenants appealed directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court. They presented eight questions for Court’s consideration,
all of which, again, pertained to issues of due process and equal
protection.118 The appellants-tenants focused their arguments on three
features of Oregon’s FED law:
[T]he requirement of a trial no later than six days after service of
the complaint unless security for accruing rent is provided; the
provisions of [the statute] which, either on their face or as
construed, are said to limit the triable issues in an FED suit to the
tenant’s default and to preclude consideration of defenses based
on the landlord’s breach of a duty to maintain the premises; and
the requirement of posting bond on appeal from an adverse
decision in twice the amount of rent expected to accrue pending
appellate decision.119

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
424 P.2d 242 (Or. 1967).
Lindsey, 341 F. Supp. at 642.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64, 69, 74 (1972).
Brief for Appellants at 7–8, Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (No. 70-5045).
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 64.
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Of these issues, the Court held that only the third, the requirement to post
double bond pending appeal, was unconstitutional. 120
The Court discussed separately the other two issues under the
frameworks of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Court addressed the question of whether
the requirement of a quick trial violated the Due Process Clause by
providing an “unduly short time for trial preparation.”121 Under Oregon’s
FED statute, FED cases could proceed from complaint to trial in as few as
six days, which is substantially similar to the time frames still in place in
many states.122 At oral argument, the tenants argued that the turnaround was
“so short as to make a mockery of the judicial system.” 123 Ultimately, the
Court disagreed.124 In justifying its holding that the short timeframe did not
violate due process, the Court stated that
[t]enants would appear to have as much access to relevant facts
as their landlord, and they can be expected to know the terms of
their lease, whether they have paid their rent, whether they are in
possession of the premises, and whether they have received a
proper notice to quit, if one is necessary.125
With this statement, the Court revealed its fundamental misunderstanding
of the realities of the landlord-tenant relationship, especially for lowincome tenants. For decades, poor tenants have struggled with the
expectation that they continue to pay rent for substandard housing, which
was the situation for the plaintiff-tenants in Lindsey.126 In the next
paragraph, the Court referred to the “simplicity of the issues in the typical

120. Id. at 64, 74.
121. Id. at 65.
122. For example, Tennessee law requires that an FED complaint be served “not . . . less
than six (6) days” before the trial is to take place. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-18-117 (2021).
123. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (No. 70-5045). The
tenants’ position was supported in amicus briefs by several legal aid organizations around
the country; for example, one brief came from the Legal Aid Bureau of Baltimore. See
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae, Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (No. 70-5045), 1971 WL 133282.
124. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73.
125. Id. at 65.
126. See id.; Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under) Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 97, 99–100 (2019) [hereinafter Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement].
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FED action.”127 Many tenants, especially low-income tenants, would take
issue with the Court’s characterization of their disputes. 128
Next, the Court addressed whether Oregon’s statute violated due process
by limiting the defenses a tenant may raise. 129 Oregon’s law limited the
tenant from asserting, for example, claims that the landlord had failed to
properly maintain the premises. 130 The Court said that because the Oregon
statute also prohibited landlords from asserting claims other than possession
in an FED suit, including any claims for back rent, there was not a due
process violation. 131 While these limitations on the landlord’s claims in
Oregon existed at the time of the Lindsey decision, most states today allow
landlords to assert claims for back rent in addition to claims for
possession. 132 If anything, this allowance further prejudices tenants because
they are frequently prevented from, either by statute or practice, asserting
defenses to dispute or mitigate the amount the landlord claims is owed. 133
As part of this discussion, the Court also stated that it saw nothing in the
Constitution to prevent Oregon from treating the covenants of the landlord
and tenant as independent and not dependent. 134 This supported the
majority’s assertion that even though “[d]ue process requires that there be
an opportunity to present every available defense,” 135 Oregon’s—and other
states’—structuring of the independent covenants of the landlord and tenant
meant that the tenant’s defense of the landlord’s failure to habitably
maintain the premises was not in fact a defense that was “available” under

127. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65.
128. See generally Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement, supra note 126.
129. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65.
130. Id. at 65–66.
131. Id.
132. See Super, supra note 11, at 405, 424.
133. For example, in General Sessions Courts in Shelby County, Tennessee, after
landlords (or, more frequently, their attorneys) state the amount that they claim is owed by a
tenant, the judge will usually ask the tenant, “Do you agree or disagree?” If the tenant says
she agrees, regardless of any mitigating circumstances, a judgment is entered against the
tenant for possession and money, and the tenant is told to “go out in the hallway” to see if
something can be worked out with the landlord to avoid actual eviction. See generally KATY
RAMSEY MASON & AUSTIN HARRISON, MEMPHIS HOUSING (IN)JUSTICE : AN ANALYSIS OF THE
EVICTION PROCESS IN SHELBY COUNTY, TN 10–11 (forthcoming 2022).
134. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 68.
135. Id. at 66 (quoting American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)).
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state law.136 The Court declined to see any constitutional problem with that
system. 137
The Court then turned to the equal protection issues. The appellantstenants argued that Oregon’s FED statute unconstitutionally treated tenantlitigants differently than all other civil litigants because of the quick
turnaround from complaint to trial, as well as the limitation on defenses and
other claims.138 The Court disagreed, however, stating that while the statute
may treat tenants differently from other civil litigants, it does not treat
tenants differently from each other: “The statute potentially applies to all
tenants, rich and poor, commercial and noncommercial; it cannot be faulted
for over-exclusiveness or under-exclusiveness.”139 With this statement, the
majority again demonstrated its misapprehension of landlord-tenant law and
the actual differences between rich, poor, residential, and commercial
tenants.140 As part of this discussion, the Court also stated that
[t]here are unique factual and legal characteristics of the
landlord-tenant relationship that justify special statutory
treatment inapplicable to other litigants. The tenant is, by
definition, in possession of the property of the landlord; unless a
judicially supervised mechanism is provided for what would
otherwise be swift repossession by the landlord himself, the
tenant would be able to deny the landlord the rights of income
incident to ownership by refusing to pay rent and by preventing
sale or rental to someone else.141
With this statement, the Court reinforced the legal system’s centuries-long
prioritization of the landlord’s right to possession above all other
considerations in the landlord-tenant relationship. This prioritization is a
hierarchical conception that assumes the rights of better-resourced
landowners are more important than the rights of their non-landowning,
poorer tenants.142 To drive its point home, the Court next stated the holding
for which the Lindsey case is most frequently cited—that the Constitution

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 66–69.
Id.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Lindsey, 405 U.S. 56 (No. 70-5045).
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 70.
See infra Section IV.B.
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 72.
See supra Part I.
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does not provide a fundamental right to decent housing. 143 It also rejected
the tenants’ contention that they had a “fundamental interest” in the “right
to retain peaceful possession of one’s home.” 144
Finally, the Court turned to the requirement of Oregon’s FED statute that
a tenant seeking to appeal an adverse judgment had to post a bond of twice
the amount of rent that had accrued from “the commencement of the action
in which the judgment was rendered until final judgment in the action.” 145
The Court agreed with the tenants that this double-bond requirement
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it prevented poor people from
accessing the courts in the way that rich people could. 146 The Court
emphasized that its decision on this issue was grounded in the fact that
there need not be any demonstration that the double bond was related to
actual rent or damages.147 While the Court’s decision laudably reflected
statutory and judicial changes arising from the tenants’ rights revolution,
many states still impose onerous requirements on tenants seeking to appeal
judgments in FED cases. For example, Tennessee requires that a tenant be
prepared to post a bond equivalent to a year’s worth of rent, an amount that
is likely impossible for even nonindigent tenants. 148 When tenants are
unable to post this bond, courts will routinely grant landlords’ motions to
issue a writ of possession, deciding the issue of who is entitled to
possession and leaving only the issue of monetary damages, if asserted. 149
C. The Lindsey Dissents
Although both Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan concurred with the
Court’s ruling on the double-bond requirement in Lindsey, each filed a

143. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74.
144. Id. at 73–74.
145. Id. at 76 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 105.160 (repealed 1977)).
146. Id. at 77, 79. Yet the Court also stated, “The nonindigent FED appellant also is
confronted by a substantial barrier to appeal faced by no other civil litigant in Oregon.” Id. at
79.
147. Id. at 78–79.
148. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-18-130(b)(2) (2021).
149. See, e.g., Docket Entry on August 28, 2020, Rivergrove v. Butler, No. CT-2810-20
(Shelby Cnty. Ct., Tenn. July 15, 2020), https://circuitdata.shelbycountytn.gov/crweb/
ck_public_qry_doct.cp_dktrpt_frames?backto=P&case_id=CT-2810-20&begin_date=&
end_date= (granting the landlord’s motion to issue a writ of possession due to the
defendant’s failure to “post the required bond to maintain possession during the appeal”).
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dissent.150 Notably, Justice Douglas grounded his opinion in the notion that
“[m]odern man’s place of retreat for quiet and solace is the home. Whether
rented or owned, it is his sanctuary.”151 In outlining his objections to the
majority’s assertion that Oregon’s FED statute did not restrain access to the
courts for poor tenants, he quoted the Javins decision, describing the “well
known package of goods and services” that a tenant expects when renting a
residence.152 If a tenant does not receive those goods and services and
withholds rent, or if a landlord otherwise decides that he or she has grounds
to seek eviction, Justice Douglas agreed with the tenants that the summary
procedure that allows for only a few days between complaint and trial
“usually will mean in actuality no opportunity to be heard” and should be
considered a due process violation.153 Justice Douglas demonstrated a much
more complete understanding of the actual challenges that low-income
tenants face in finding decent and affordable housing and accessing the
courts to assert their rights when things go wrong.
Justice Douglas also articulated the challenge of situating landlord-tenant
law in the legal canon. He wrote, “The issue that confronts the Court is not
whether such a view is constitutionally compelled, but whether, since
Oregon has gone this far as a matter of state law, the requirements of due
process permit a restriction of contract-type defenses in an FED action.” 154
Justice Douglas identified the inconsistencies of whether and how courts
should apply principles of contract law to landlord-tenant disputes that also
have roots in property law. The majority had relied on the property law
conception of the landlord’s right to possession above all else.
IV. The Continuing Insufficiency of the Summary Eviction Process
Despite some positive developments at the state level, the summary
process itself still poses an insurmountable barrier to meaningful reform of
the eviction process. The Lindsey decision ensured that the summary
process for evictions, which prioritizes the landlord’s claim of possession
above all other considerations, remains the law of the land to this day. Thus,
the constitutional issues raised in Lindsey still plague low-income tenants.
150. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 79–80; id. at 90 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); id. at 92
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 84 (quoting Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074).
153. See id. at 85.
154. Id. at 89.
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To equalize the legal relationship between landlord and tenant, states must
consider serious revisions to the summary process. This Part argues that due
to the legal, political, and social changes that have occurred since Lindsey,
the summary eviction process has become increasingly out of sync with
modern conceptions of justice. This Part details the empirical data and
scholarship that show that even with the reforms described in the previous
Part, the summary eviction process remains an inadequate legal mechanism
for modern considerations. However, the effects of eviction do not end with
a court judgment; its consequences reverberate through the lives of tenants
and their families for years to come. As a result, there are serious
implications for racial justice, and the current legal structure does not
adequately account for those impacts.
A. Evidence of the Insufficiency of the Summary Eviction Process
Tenants’ advocates across the United States have long lamented the
perceived unfairness of the summary eviction process. Until recently, there
were relatively few empirical studies of eviction courts to document and
support this perception. 155 Beginning in the 2010s with Matthew
Desmond’s groundbreaking research in Milwaukee, 156 there has been an
expanding recognition of the importance of empirical data about the
eviction process. Legal and social sciences scholars have begun to examine
various aspects of eviction proceedings, including the disparate rate of legal
representation between landlords and tenants, enforcement of the warranty
of habitability, and opportunities for tenants to present defenses to eviction.
1. Overcrowded Dockets, Short Hearings, and Due Process Concerns
In the past twenty years, data has accumulated to demonstrate how the
eviction court process is manifestly unfair to tenants. In the Lindsey
opinion, the Supreme Court ruled on several due process concerns raised by
the tenants-appellants,157 but one issue the Court did not address was the
length of eviction court hearings. Scholars have analyzed the number of
155. One major exception was Barbara Bezdek’s 1992 study of rent court in Baltimore,
in which she documented the ways in which “Baltimore’s rent court systematically excludes
from the law’s prescriptions litigants who are members of socially subordinated groups,”
including people of color, low-income tenants, and women. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the
Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 534, 534 n.4 (1992).
156. See generally Desmond, supra note 5.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 95–117.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/5

2022]

HOUSING INJUSTICE & SUMMARY EVICTION

415

cases that appear on eviction court dockets and measured the amount of
time that tenants are afforded in front of judges. 158 The results of these
studies have brought to light additional due process deficiencies in the
summary eviction process.
One of the most striking commonalities of eviction courts throughout the
United States is the high volume of cases that are scheduled on one docket.
Relatedly, tenants are afforded very little time to make their cases in front
of a judge. Research in Baltimore during the early 1990s showed that “a
single judge deals with as many as 2500 cases on a daily docket.” 159 A 2003
study of housing courts in Chicago found that eviction hearings took an
average of one minute and forty-four seconds.160 A 2021 study of eviction
hearings in Memphis showed that more than 95% of cases were heard in
fewer than two minutes.161
These high-volume dockets and extremely fast hearings have serious due
process implications for tenants.162 In its most basic form, procedural due
process consists of notice and the opportunity to be heard. 163 All too often
in eviction cases, the only party whose case is heard is the landlord. In
many courts, landlords (or their attorneys) will state their case, and the
judge will simply ask the tenants whether they agree with the landlord’s
statement.164 In eviction proceedings in Memphis, nearly 74.5% of tenants

158. See infra notes 159–61.
159. Bezdek, supra note 155, at 534–35.
160. KAREN DORAN ET AL., LAWS. COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE : A
STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT 4 (Dec. 2003), https://lcbh.org/sites/default/files/
resources/2003-lcbh-chicago-eviction-court-study.pdf.
161. See RAMSEY MASON & HARRISON, supra note 133, at 10.
162. See Allyson E. Gold, No Home for Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health
Inequity Among Low-Income and Minority Tenants, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 59,
64 (2016). Commenting on the report from the Lawyers’ Committee for Better Housing,
Gold writes, “The brevity of [eviction] cases produces repeated procedural and substantive
law failures.” Id.
163. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). “The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 267 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
164. Bezdek, supra note 155, at 566 (describing the “dullingly standard script” of
eviction proceedings in Baltimore); RAMSEY MASON & HARRISON, supra note 133, at 11.
This is consistent with this author’s observations of numerous eviction proceedings in
Memphis, where judges ask tenants if they “agree or disagree” with the landlord’s
allegations, usually about the amount of rent money owed. If the tenants say that they agree,
a judgment is entered immediately, and tenants are told to go wait in the hallway to see if
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raise no defense in their cases, and the vast majority of those cases result in
possessory-only or possessory and monetary judgments against the
tenant.165
Another consideration for the tenant’s opportunity to be heard is the
length of time that tenants have in front of judges. It is perhaps an obvious
conclusion that if judges are handling dockets approaching a hundred cases
within a span of two hours, most litigants will have a very short amount of
time to present their cases. In court observation data collected in Memphis
in 2021, 85.5% of eviction hearings took fewer than two minutes, and more
than 70% took under one minute. 166 These durations strongly indicate that
tenants’ due process rights are not fully protected in eviction proceedings.
2. Lack of Legal Representation for Tenants
Another consideration the Lindsey Court did not address was the right to
access legal counsel in eviction proceedings and the effect that would have
on case outcomes. Subsequently, this has been one of the most widely
studied areas regarding the eviction court process. According to the
Eviction Lab at Princeton University, an estimated 3.7 million eviction
cases are filed against tenants each year in the United States. 167 In most
courts, however, fewer than 10% of tenants are represented by attorneys,
while upwards of 90% of landlords have lawyers.168 Most tenants who do
not have attorneys cannot afford them. 169 The result of this representation

they can “work something out” with the landlord before the statutory ten-day stay on the
execution of the eviction writ expires.
165. See RAMSEY MASON & HARRISON, supra note 133, at 11.
166. Id. at 10.
167. EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/ (last visited May 12, 2022).
168. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing
Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 47 (2010). In
many courts, the rate of representation of tenants is well below 10%. For example, a 2021
study conducted in Shelby County, Tennessee General Sessions Court, which includes
Memphis, found that around 4% of tenants were represented by attorneys in eviction cases,
though that number was likely higher than normal due to the availability of legal aid and
volunteer attorneys through the Emergency Rent Assistance Program, funded by federal
pandemic stimulus funds. See RAMSEY MASON & HARRISON, supra note 133, at 8, 10.
Almost 90% of landlords had legal representation. Id. at 10.
169. Russell Engler, When Does Representation Matter?, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS
TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 71, 72 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016)
[hereinafter Engler, When Does Representation Matter?].
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imbalance is that landlords are more likely to prevail in their claims. 170
Relatedly, when judges become accustomed to only having lawyers on one
side of eviction cases, they are more likely to favor the positions of
landlords.171
The lack of access to legal representation compounds the barriers to
tenants that the summary eviction process already presents. Even in courts
where legal representation is uncommon on either side of eviction cases, the
characteristics of the summary eviction process that are intended to promote
efficiency mean that tenants are unable to effectively assert their rights. 172
Because of the primacy of the issue of possession in the summary eviction
process, other issues that may impact the tenancy (or the tenant’s ability or
decision to pay rent) are subjugated to the tenant’s defensive posture. 173
Most commonly, these issues are related to the conditions in the property. 174
While every state allows for tenants to affirmatively sue landlords who fail
to meet their obligations under the lease contract, including failure to make
repairs, few tenants actually do so. 175 Therefore, tenants are usually left to
raise their complaints about landlords’ behavior as a secondary
consideration to whether the landlords are entitled to possession. 176 The
170. See Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 419, 427 (2001). Seron et al. found that when tenants were randomly assigned
lawyers in housing court, only 32% of them had judgments entered against them, compared
to 52% of tenants who were not assigned lawyers. Id.
171. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
55, 78–79 (2018) [hereinafter Sabbeth, Housing Defense]. Bezdek’s study found that judges
were more likely to award default judgments to landlords when tenants failed to appear in
court or were late, yet judges were willing to hold the case and wait when the landlord was
late. Bezdek, supra note 155, at 555–56.
172. See generally Bezdek, supra note 155, at 553–57. Even in Baltimore, where state
law allows for tenants to seek rent abatements based on landlords’ failures to properly
maintain the premises, judgments were entered for landlords in two-thirds of eviction cases,
and rent abatements were ordered by the court only 1.75% of the time. Id. at 554.
173. See id. at 559.
174. See id. (“[O]ver 60% of the respondent tenants in the exit interviews reported what
they believed to be unsafe conditions in their homes.”); Summers, supra note 68, at 37
(showing that 50% of tenants in nonpayment eviction cases in New York City asserted a
need for repairs in their answers to eviction complaints).
175. For example, Bezdek’s study in Baltimore found that tenants were plaintiffs in only
0.05% of landlord-tenant actions. Bezdek, supra note 155, at 554–55. Again, the lack of
availability for free or low-cost legal services contributes to this problem, as court
procedures can be costly and difficult to navigate for pro se litigants.
176. Bezdek, supra note 155, at 554–55.
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data shows that the summary process is simply not equipped to address the
problems affecting many tenants’ experiences.
Recent scholarship suggests that the traditional explanations for
overwhelmingly negative outcomes for tenants in eviction proceedings are
incomplete, especially in situations where they are asserting warranty of
habitability claims as defenses.177 In theory, the summary eviction process
allows for an efficient remedy for landlords seeking possession of rental
properties and also provides opportunities for tenants to assert meritorious
defenses to the claim of possession. 178 In the nonpayment eviction context,
those defenses are most likely to relate to conditions. 179 Some states allow
tenants to seek rent abatements during eviction proceedings as a remedy for
a landlord’s breach, though the success rate in abatement claims is
generally very low. 180 Legal scholars have posited two main reasons for
this: first, that the process for asserting defenses and counterclaims based
on poor conditions is too burdensome for pro se litigants; and second, that
there is insufficient access to legal counsel, even for tenants who have
meritorious defenses and counterclaims. 181 However, lack of legal
representation alone cannot account for the low success rate in abatement
claims. Nicole Summers’s recent study in New York City found that while
tenants with legal representation were more likely to succeed on their
abatement claims than unrepresented tenants, “[m]ost represented tenants—
approximately three-quarters—with meritorious warranty of habitability
claims did not receive rent abatements, even when they had open code
violations in their units.”182 Other studies have similarly found that legal
knowledge and legal representation do not necessarily account for the
drastically different outcomes for landlords and tenants in eviction cases. 183
While Summers did not speculate about the reason for the unexpectedly
low success rate, even for tenants with lawyers, it seems likely that it relates
177. Summers, supra note 68, at 52–53 (noting that a lack of legal representation,
although contributory, could not entirely account for tenants’ negative outcomes in eviction
cases).
178. See supra notes 6–8, 48 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
180. Summers, supra note 68, at 31. Summers’s study found that less than 2% of tenants
received rent abatements for meritorious claims based on the warranty of habitability. Id.
181. Id. at 32.
182. Id. at 49.
183. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 155, at 562 (“Representation is a complicated and
ultimately unsatisfying explanation for the differences in success rates between landlords
and tenants.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/5

2022]

HOUSING INJUSTICE & SUMMARY EVICTION

419

to the limitations of the summary eviction process itself. Tenants cannot
achieve full justice, even with legal representation, if the process in which
they operate is fundamentally flawed.
3. Tenants’ Misunderstandings of Settlement Agreements
An issue related to the problem of insufficient legal representation for
tenants is that pro se tenants, interacting primarily with attorneys
representing landlords, are frequently expected to sign legally binding
settlement agreements that they do not fully understand and that therefore
present compliance obstacles for tenants. 184 The Lindsey Court did not
address, or even necessarily foresee, the effects of high-volume, fastmoving eviction courts and the imbalance of legal representation between
tenants and landlords. These factors, however, have tangible impacts for
tenants in eviction court.
There are numerous problems with many eviction courts’ reliance on
settlement agreements entered into by pro se tenants. First, tenants may not
understand that often, by signing a settlement or payment agreement, they
are also consenting to a judgment that may go on their credit reports or
eventually result in eviction if the tenant fails to meet all the terms of the
agreement.185 Second, tenants often agree to settlements in exchange for
landlords agreeing to perform certain obligations, such as making repairs. 186
However, the landlords’ obligations in the agreements are seldom
enforced. 187 Third, in many jurisdictions—especially in larger cities with
stronger tenants’ rights schemes—settlement agreements are often reduced
to writing. There are other jurisdictions, however, where tenants agree,
184. See Sabbeth, Housing Defense, supra note 171, at 79–80.
185. Harold J. Krent et al., Eviction Court and a Judicial Duty of Inquiry, 24 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 547, 550 (2016); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—
Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators, and Clerks,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1989 (1999) (“Settlement agreements routinely involve the
waiver of significant rights by unrepresented litigants.”); see also Summers, supra note 68,
at 33 (“Nearly all settlements take the form of repayment agreements in which the tenant
agrees to pay the rental arrears owed within a stated period of time.”).
186. See Summers, supra note 68, at 36. Summers describes the process of judicial
review of settlement agreements in New York City Housing Court, which has stronger
tenant protection measures than many other jurisdictions. “Judges . . . ask tenants whether
repairs are needed as part of the judge’s review of the settlement agreement. Whenever the
tenant reports that repairs are needed, the judge will require that the agreement include a
provision obligating their performance.” Id. at 34.
187. Id. at 39.
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knowingly or unknowingly, to the entry of judgments against them and later
enter into informal, often unenforceable, settlement agreements with the
landlords to avoid actual eviction.188
Some courts have recognized and tried to address the issue of tenants
signing settlement agreements with which they cannot comply. One of the
best examples is Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King, an Illinois appellate court
decision in which the court held that a settlement agreement signed by a pro
se tenant should be vacated. 189 The tenant, a Section 8 housing recipient,
had agreed to a judgment against her in the amount of $198.09, thinking
that if she paid the full amount, she would be able to remain in her home
under a “pay and stay” arrangement.190 She did not understand that she had,
in actuality, agreed to vacate the unit.191 The court vacated the settlement
agreement that the pro se tenant had signed with the landlord’s attorney
using a contract law analysis that requires a “meeting of the minds” when
two parties sign a binding settlement agreement. 192 Given that the tenant did
not understand the terms she was agreeing to, the court found that there was
no meeting of the minds and vacated the agreement. 193 There have been
other examples of courts vacating settlement agreements signed by tenants
in similar circumstances. In Community Realty Management, Inc. v. Harris,
the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that because the tenant did not
understand the terms of the settlement agreement she signed with her
landlord, she could not be bound by them. 194
These decisions underscore how the summary eviction process upheld by
Lindsey is inadequate to meet even the basic procedural rights of tenants,
especially when they are unrepresented by counsel. These concerns can be
188. For example, in Memphis, it is commonplace for judges to ask tenants if they “agree
or disagree” with the landlord’s allegations of rent owed. See RAMSEY MASON & HARRISON,
supra note 133, at 11. If the tenant says they agree, a judgment is entered immediately—
often without the judge articulating that it is happening. See id. at 10. Therefore, tenants
frequently either do not understand that a judgment has been entered, or mistakenly believe
that if they reach a post-judgment agreement with the landlord, outside of court, that they
can avoid eviction. See generally infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
189. Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. King, 24 N.E.3d 851, 855, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
190. Id. at 855.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 863, 869.
193. Id. at 864.
194. Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. v. Harris, 714 A.2d 282, 290–92 (N.J. 1998). The court
stated, “[F]or a consent judgment to be valid, like a contract, the parties’ consent must be
knowing and informed.” Id. at 289.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss3/5

2022]

HOUSING INJUSTICE & SUMMARY EVICTION

421

alleviated in certain situations, such as when a judge takes the time to
explain the terms of a settlement agreement to a tenant and ensure that the
tenant understands. But in most jurisdictions, this practice is still by far the
exception rather than the rule. 195 Other scholars have suggested additional
reforms on the court’s side, 196 as further discussed in Part V.
B. The Collateral Consequences of Eviction
The consequences of eviction are not limited to the outcomes in court.
Research has demonstrated that the impacts of eviction continue far beyond
the conclusion of the legal proceedings and can affect tenants and their
families for years afterward. This research further underscores the need for
reform of the process since the current process not only fails to account for
these effects but in fact perpetuates them. This Section reviews some of the
most significant collateral consequences of evictions.
First, in 2022, it is impossible to ignore the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic on the problem of housing injustice. Prior to the pandemic,
research by Matthew Desmond had demonstrated that eviction is a serious
problem for people of color; the population most at risk of eviction across
the country is Black women with children. 197 People of color are generally
at higher risk of eviction than their White counterparts,198 mirroring who
has been most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. 199 People of color have
been more likely to get sick, be hospitalized, and die from COVID-19, 200
and also to suffer the economic consequences of the pandemic, including
job and income loss and food and housing insecurity. 201
Desmond’s research shows that eviction is not just a consequence of
poverty; it often results in increased poverty and material hardship for

195. See Krent et al., supra note 185, at 551–52.
196. See, e.g., Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47
CONN. L. REV. 741 (2015).
197. See Desmond, supra note 5, at 102.
198. See id.
199. Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups, CDC (Nov. 30,
2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.
html.
200. Id.
201. See generally Bradley Hardy & Trevon D. Logan, Racial Economic Inequality Amid
the COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
racial-economic-inequality-amid-the-covid-19-crisis/.
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tenants and their families. 202 Children of evicted tenants are likely to
experience severe social and health impacts as a result of the eviction. 203 If
families are evicted and become homeless, children’s educational progress
is likely to be disrupted, as the family may no longer reside in the district
where the child was previously attending school, or the family may lack
transportation to get the student to school. 204 If students are homeless for an
extended period of time, they may be relocating frequently and thus unable
to attend school regularly. 205 In fact, studies have shown that children who
are homeless are significantly less likely to perform at grade level than their
non-homeless peers.206
Additionally, eviction can negatively affect a tenant’s credit rating and
rental history. Following an eviction, or even an eviction court filing,
tenants face difficulty in finding new housing because landlords who run
background checks or credit checks may refuse to rent to tenants with prior
evictions.207 Eviction judgments, including monetary judgments, are often
reported to credit bureaus and can stay on tenants’ credit histories for
years.208 Even for tenants who manage to avoid a judgment in court, the
filing itself can have a negative impact on their ability to find new housing
since many prospective landlords will not distinguish between eviction
filings and eviction judgments.209 In situations where the eviction is
reported to credit bureaus, it can negatively impact the tenant’s ability to
find employment or qualify for student loans. 210
Recent research has shown eviction also impacts the health and
wellbeing of tenants and their families. Substandard housing is already a
202. Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction’s Fallout: Housing,
Hardship, and Health, 94 SOC. FORCES 295, 317 (2015).
203. Id.
204. Philip T.K. Daniel & Jeffrey C. Sun, Falling Short in Sheltering Homeless Students:
Supporting the Student Achievement Priority Through the McKinney-Vento Act, 312 EDUC.
L. REP. 489, 490–91 (2015).
205. Id.
206. Id. Daniel and Sun point out that “only one-third of homeless students read at the
same grade level as more than half of their domiciled peers of the same age.” Id.
207. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 202, at 299.
208. See D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A
Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126
HARV. L. REV. 901, 914 (2013).
209. Katelyn Polk, Screened Out of Housing: The Impact of Misleading Tenant
Screening Reports and the Potential for Criminal Expungement as a Model for Effectively
Sealing Evictions, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 338, 339–40 (2020).
210. See id. at 345.
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pervasive problem for low-income renters.211 Many of the poor housing
conditions that tenants live with have serious physical and mental
consequences.212 For example, common poor housing conditions—
including dust, mold, lead paint, and inadequate ventilation—can lead to
health problems such as “asthma, lead poisoning, elevated blood pressure,
developmental delays, heart disease, and exposure to communicable
diseases.”213 Eviction can exacerbate these issues: tenants who have been
evicted are more likely to move into poorer-quality housing in worse
neighborhoods than where they were living prior to the eviction. 214 Evicted
tenants also experience negative mental health outcomes. 215 Housing
instability can lead to depression, anxiety, and an increase in stress
levels.216 A recent study in Memphis, Tennessee, comparing eviction filing
rates to mental health census data found a strong correlation between high
numbers of eviction filings and self-reported poor mental health, especially
in majority Black neighborhoods.217
Eviction has traumatic and long-lasting legal, social, and health
consequences for tenants and their children. These effects are unaccounted
for in structure of the summary eviction process, providing further
justification for reform.
C. Racial Justice, Evictions, and Housing Instability
Beyond the negative consequences for individual tenants and their
families, the continued use of the summary eviction process perpetuates
systemic problems of housing instability and racial justice. It is no secret
that people of color are at higher risk of eviction than their White
counterparts.218 Neighborhoods and communities of color are therefore
more subject to the destabilizing effects of eviction. 219 One study of
211. See generally Gold, supra note 162, at 61.
212. Id. at 70–73 (describing the types of poor housing conditions that many low-income
tenants deal with and their associated health effects).
213. Id. at 70.
214. Desmond, supra note 5, at 118–19.
215. Gold, supra note 162, at 73.
216. Id.
217. Courtnee Melton-Fant, Austin Harrison & Katy Ramsey Mason, Race, Mental
Health, and Evictions Filings in Memphis, TN, USA, 26 Preventative Med. Reps. 1, art. no.
101736 (2022), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211335522000432.
218. See Desmond, supra note 5, at 102.
219. Davida Finger, The Eviction Geography of New Orleans: An Empirical Study to
Further Housing Justice, 22 UDC L. REV. 23, 39 (2020).
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eviction filing data in New Orleans found that neighborhoods that were
predominantly Black had as many as fifteen more evictions per block than
neighborhoods that were not majority Black. 220 Studies document the
disproportionate effect of eviction on Black neighborhoods in other cities
across the country. 221
V. Possibilities and Options for State-Level Reform
Despite the advancements of the tenants’ rights revolution, states have,
with few exceptions, continued to prioritize a landlord’s claim for
possession above all else.222 As Justice Douglas implied in his dissent to
Lindsey, the Court in 1972 took too narrow a view of the totality of the
modern landlord-tenant relationship and ignored important considerations
concerning access to justice and the subjugation of poor people’s rights. 223
Since then, the issues that the Court overlooked have only grown in
magnitude and importance. At this point, however, new federal litigation is
unlikely to yield positive results because of the extremely conservative
makeup of the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court.224 Even in the
depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, federal judges showed hostility to CDC
measures intended to protect vulnerable tenants from eviction and mitigate
the spread of the virus.225 As a result, the possibilities for true reform of the
220. Id. at 37.
221. See Desmond, supra note 5, at 91 (examining neighborhoods in Milwaukee);
Melton-Fant, Harrison & Ramsey Mason, supra note 217, at 2 (examining neighborhoods in
Memphis).
222. There have been states that have moved further towards balancing the equities in the
landlord-tenant relationship. For example, New York has imposed much stronger notice and
pleading requirements in what it calls holdover eviction cases; that is, evictions that are
based on something other than nonpayment of rent. See generally ANDREW SCHERER & FERN
FISHER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN NEW YORK ch. 8 (2020 ed.). For example,
a notice to quit must be served on a tenant at least ten days prior to filing a lawsuit. N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 713 (McKinney 2010).
223. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
224. See generally Seung Min Kim, Trump’s Conservative Imprint on the Federal
Judiciary Gives Democrats a Playbook – If They Win, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/court-barrett-senate-trump/2020/
10/25/d9eed9c0-16bc-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html (noting that three Supreme
Court justices and approximately 30% of sitting circuit court judges were appointed by
Trump).
225. See, e.g., Tiger Lily, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 992 F.3d 518, 524
(6th Cir. 2021) (finding that the Public Health Service Act of 1994 did not grant the CDC
power to impose a nationwide eviction moratorium).
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summary eviction process lie with the states, and reform is urgently needed
to address the imbalances and ongoing injustices perpetuated by the current
outdated system. This Part presents questions and issues for states to
consider as they contemplate the problems with the summary eviction
process.
A. Dismantling the Primacy of the Landlord’s Claim to Possession
The Lindsey Court never questioned the foundational assumption of the
summary eviction process: that the landlord’s primary remedy is and should
be repossession of the rental property, no matter the basis for the dispute. 226
In 1972, when the Court decided Lindsey, this was already an outdated
notion, and it has only become more so in the intervening fifty years. In
addition to prioritizing the claim for possession, many states also allow
landlords to join claims for unpaid rent and other damages. 227 Most eviction
cases that are filed across the country are based on nonpayment of rent, and,
even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many of those cases were brought
for amounts less than one month’s rent.228 Yet in many situations, the
summary eviction process has become pretext, allowing landlords to
accomplish other goals while holding over tenants’ heads the threat of
displacement. The ease of eviction filing in many jurisdictions has resulted
in what some scholars have called “serial eviction filing,” which is defined
as multiple evictions filed against the same address. 229 For some landlords,
the goal of filing eviction cases is not to actually regain possession of the
property but to collect the monetary debt the tenant owes. 230 This is
226. See Spector, supra note 6, at 157–59.
227. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-18-125 (2021) (“[T]he judge . . . trying the cause
shall be authorized and it shall be the judge’s duty to ascertain the arrearage of rent, interest,
and damages, if any, and render judgment therefor if the judge’s judgment shall be that the
plaintiff recover possession.”).
228. Emily Badger, Many Renters Who Face Eviction Owe Less Than $600, N.Y. TIMES:
THEUPSHOT (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/12/upshot/evictionprevention-solutions-government.html. “In data [Matthew Desmond’s] Eviction Lab has
analyzed from 22 states, that situation of tenants deep in debt is rare. It’s far more common,
the lab has found, that tenants owe the equivalent of less than a month’s rent.” Id.
229. Lillian Leung, Peter Hepburn & Matthew Desmond, Serial Eviction Filing: Civil
Courts, Property Management, and the Threat of Displacement, 100 SOC. FORCES 316, 316
(2020).
230. Id. at 318.
This strategy may also allow property owners to profit from late payments.
Tenants threatened with eviction not only must pay their rent in full; they are
also charged late fines and legal fees, including costs associated with attorneys
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accomplished either when the landlord obtains a judgment from the court,
even if he or she chooses not to follow through on the actual eviction, or
when the threat of eviction scares the tenant into paying the money owed. 231
Some landlords even prefer to keep tenants owing small amounts in arrears
because it provides justification to seek repossession of the premises at any
time, for any reason, under the legal cover of nonpayment of rent. 232
Furthermore, the question of the right to possession does not adequately
address the other factors that make up the totality of the circumstances of
the landlord-tenant relationship. While the landlord may be statutorily
entitled to seek rent debt as part of an action to recover possession, the
limitations of the summary eviction process mean that the tenant is often
not similarly entitled to raise issues that might mitigate or negate the
obligation to pay rent.233 The disconnect between the claims that landlords
are allowed to make as part of the summary eviction process and those that
tenants are allowed to make is especially stark in light of the modern trend
towards consolidating issues in litigation into as few proceedings as
possible. 234 This reality is sadly not surprising, given the long history of
courts and governments failing to enforce the rights of poor tenants. 235
To make real progress toward housing justice for tenants, the underlying
assumption that possession is the ultimate issue must be challenged. This
continued emphasis on the question of which party is entitled to possession
is a significant obstacle to tenants, especially when a dispute’s factual root
is about money owed, condition of the property, or something else entirely.
State courts and governments should consider dismantling the primacy of
possession when seeking to reform the summary eviction process.
B. Dismantling the Traditional Summary Eviction Process
Given that possession is often not the primary goal in tenant-landlord
disputes, the summary eviction process needs to be broken down and
reconstituted in a form that more accurately reflects modern notions of
and court filings. These hidden costs of the housing crisis may be common if
landlords routinely rely on eviction court for rent collection.
Id.
231. See id. at 318–19.
232. Philip ME Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of
Eviction, 18 CITY & CMTY. 638, 638 (2019).
233. See supra Section IV.A.1.
234. See Spector, supra note 6, at 156–57.
235. See generally Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement, supra note 126.
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fairness and justice and more effectively addresses the parties’ actual goals
and considerations. This subsection outlines several suggestions for how
states can modify the court process to account for these concerns.
1. Impose Higher Bars for Possession Claims
One of the hallmarks of the traditional summary eviction process is the
speed and ease with which landlords can regain possession of their
property. As detailed above, courts’ prioritization of possession above all
other considerations is alarmingly outdated. In service of the transition
away from possession as the ultimate issue, courts and legislatures can
impose more stringent requirements when landlords do, in fact, seek
possession.
Research has shown that landlords are less likely to file eviction cases
when the process is more complex and the monetary cost is higher. 236
Comparing eviction filings in Charleston, South Carolina, and Mobile,
Alabama, researchers found that the stricter procedural requirements and
higher court costs in Alabama resulted in significantly lower filing rates
than in South Carolina.237 Imposing stricter requirements on landlords
seeking possession would deter landlords who use the summary eviction
process as a mechanism to collect rent from proceeding with cases that
result in significant, unnecessary harm to tenants.
2. Allow Joinder of Claims and Discovery in Possession Cases
In situations where a landlord is truly seeking to regain possession of the
rental property, the factual circumstances can be complex. Contrary to the
Lindsey Court’s misguided assumption about the “simplicity of the issues in
the typical FED action,”238 the issues that eviction cases present can be
quite complicated. While many jurisdictions allow tenants to raise defenses
based on the conditions of the premises, 239 courts and legislatures should
explicitly allow tenants to raise any relevant defenses and join any relevant
counterclaims, just as they would be able to do in other civil proceedings.
The dispossession of tenants from their homes is a drastic event, and the
236. Leung, Hepburn & Desmond, supra note 229, at 334–37.
237. Id. at 317, 334–37. However, the comparison is relative; even in Alabama, which
had comparatively more onerous processes than South Carolina, the landlord was required to
give the tenant a seven-day notice and pay $256 to file an eviction case. Id. at 335. Other
civil actions are much more difficult to initiate and maintain.
238. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972).
239. Id. at 69; Spector, supra note 6, at 171–73.
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courts should treat it with the gravitas it deserves by allowing for the full
hearing of relevant issues.
3. Create Pre-Filing Diversion Programs for Debt Claims
In situations where the landlord seeks to recover rent owed rather than
repossession of the property, courts and legislatures should work to create
pre-filing diversion programs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was
an unprecedented influx of federal stimulus dollars to state and local
governments designated for use in paying rental arrears on behalf of tenants
who had fallen behind on rent during the pandemic. 240 While some
criticized certain jurisdictions’ slow pace in distributing the funds to renters
and landlords,241 there have also been examples of successful pre-filing
diversion programs implemented at the state and local levels. Beginning in
July 2020, Michigan used federal stimulus money to fund additional legal
services for tenants, which averted some eviction cases pre-filing and
helped tenants avoid eviction if a case had already been filed. 242 In
Philadelphia, as of April 2021, landlords have been required to apply for
rental assistance and enroll in the city’s Eviction Diversion Program prior
to filing a nonpayment eviction case in court. 243 The Eviction Diversion
Program mandates mediation between landlords and tenants within thirty
days of approval for the program. 244 According to the City of Philadelphia,
over 70% of cases that go through mediation reach a settlement
240. See How Federal Rental Assistance Works, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/coronavirus/mortgage-and-housing-assistance/renterprotections/emergency-rental-assistance-for-renters/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
241. Jason DeParle, Federal Aid to Renters Moves Slowly, Leaving Many at Risk, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/25/us/politics/rental-assistancepandemic.html.
242. ELIZABETH BENTON ET AL., UNIV. MICH. POVERTY SOLS., REDUCING MICHIGAN
EVICTIONS: THE PANDEMIC AND BEYOND 12 (June 2021), http://sites.fordschool.umich.
edu/poverty2021/files/2021/05/Poverty-Solutions_Reducing-Michigan-Evictions_
June2021.pdf.
243. Amended Order at 2, In re: Residential Eviction Moratorium and Exceptions,
Service of Writs and Alias Writs of Possession (Phila. Mun. Ct. Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/regs/2021/15-of-2021-PJ-ORDER.pdf; see also Editorial,
Philly May Have Just Revolutionized Evictions, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2021),
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/editorials/philadelphia-eviction-diversion-rent-2021040
5.html.
244. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ): City of Philadelphia’s Eviction Diversion
Program, PHL EVICTION DIVERSION, https://eviction-diversion.phila.gov/#/FAQ (last visited
Jan. 1, 2022).
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agreement.245 If the mediation is unsuccessful, landlords may continue with
the regular eviction court process.246
Pre-filing eviction diversion programs could become a permanent part of
eviction proceedings. One of the major advantages to programs that focus
on pre-filing diversion is that they avoid the significant and long-lasting
consequences for tenants of having eviction cases on their permanent
records.247 Especially when combined with increased access to legal
services, pre-filing eviction diversion programs could be highly effective in
achieving similar outcomes to cases that are settled in court and do not
result in actual eviction.
C. Improving Housing Conditions and Habitability
One of the most common justifications that tenants cite for not paying
their full rent is the poor conditions of their rental homes.248 Scholars have
posited numerous theories about the significance of warranty of habitability
claims in the landlord-tenant relationship. These theories include criticisms
of laws regarding housing conditions in rental properties and both the utility
of the doctrine itself249 and of the enforcement of existing standards.250
Encouraging greater enforcement of housing conditions and habitability
standards would reduce disputes between landlords and tenants and
therefore the need for evictions.
D. Improving Access to Counsel
Addressing the inequities that the summary eviction process imposes on
the landlord-tenant relationship requires improving tenants’ access to legal
representation. While legal representation is not a panacea to the injustices
of the summary eviction process, it has demonstrable benefits to tenants
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
248. See generally Summers, supra note 68, at 147–48; Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement,
supra note 126, at 100.
249. See generally Super, supra note 11 (arguing that the failure to transform the
landlord-tenant relationship has left tenants effectively unable to access the theoretical
protections of the warranty of habitability); Summers, supra note 68 (demonstrating that
even when tenants are able to claim the warranty of habitability as defenses or
counterclaims, they rarely are able to obtain rent abatements).
250. See generally Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement, supra note 126 (arguing that laws on
the books provide significant recourse to tenants living with substandard conditions but that
the systems in charge of enforcing those laws have failed).
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seeking to advance legitimate claims and defenses in the eviction process.
Studies comparing tenants who are represented by lawyers versus those
who are unrepresented have shown—virtually unequivocally—that tenants’
outcomes improve when they are represented.251 Furthermore, New York
City’s Right to Counsel program, which has been in effect since 2017, has
reduced eviction filings and improved housing stability for tenants. 252
Providing lawyers for tenants is an important piece of any housing justice
solution.
Conclusion
While the COVID-19 pandemic brought the eviction crisis to national
attention, it is a problem that existed before the pandemic and will almost
definitely, unfortunately, continue long after the public health emergency
subsides. While many scholars and policymakers have posited theories as to
the best ways to address the lack of safe and affordable housing, 253 largely
unstudied are the effects of the eviction court process itself. Addressing the
problem of eviction is by no means exclusively a question of social policy.
All fifty U.S. states now utilize a summary process for evictions, rooted in
the property law system that existed in common-law England.254 It is this
summary eviction process, which was designed with the express purpose of
making eviction as easy as possible for the landlord, 255 that deserves
reexamination in our twenty-first-century context. Today, it reflects an
antiquated conception of the complexities of the modern landlord-tenant
relationship.
The mid-twentieth century saw major advancements in the rights
afforded to traditionally marginalized social groups, including people of
color, women, and indigent people. 256 The concentrated efforts around the
rights of residential renters has become known as the tenants’ rights
revolution, and during the 1960s and 1970s, important legislative and
251. Greiner et al., supra note 208, at 931, 934–35; Steinberg, supra note 196, at 744;
Engler, When Does Representation Matter?, supra note 169, at 79.
252. Brian Bieretz, A Right to Counsel in Eviction: Lessons from New York City, HOUS.
MATTERS (Dec. 31, 2019), https://housingmatters.urban.org/articles/right-counsel-evictionlessons-new-york-city; see also Sabbeth, Housing Defense, supra note 171, at 81, 84.
253. See generally Super, supra note 11 (discussing the history of the doctrine of the
warranty of habitability and tenants’ expectations of safe housing).
254. Spector, supra note 6, at 137.
255. See id. at 156.
256. See Summers, supra note 68, at 157–58.
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judicial advancements sought to equalize the imbalanced landlord-tenant
relationship. 257 Chief among these developments was the codification of the
implied warranty of habitability, which was supposed to guarantee the
mutuality of the previously independent covenants of the tenant to pay rent
and the landlord to maintain the premises in a fit and habitable condition. 258
While this was an important legal advancement intended to provide tenants
with increased protections and rights in their residences, the reality of the
warranty of habitability has not lived up to its supporters’ aspirations.
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Lindsey v. Normet seriously
undermined the promises of the tenants’ rights revolution.259 When the
Supreme Court upheld the summary eviction process in the face of due
process and equal protection challenges from a group of low-income
tenants, it placed a huge roadblock in the path of meaningful reform of the
landlord-tenant relationship and the advancement of tenants’ rights. The
Court’s opinion relied on numerous outdated assumptions about the relative
positioning of landlords and tenants and the complexities of the modern
landlord-tenant relationship. As a result, the summary eviction process has
continued to be the primary mechanism for judicial evictions in every state
in the country.
The characteristics of the summary eviction process that make it
appealing to landlords are the same characteristics that have made it
devastating for the lives of many tenants. The quick turnaround from
complaint to trial and the limitations on defenses, counterclaims, and
discovery serve as insurmountable disadvantages to many tenants. As a
result, the ease and speed with which landlords can obtain judgments and
effectuate actual displacement of tenants has contributed to an incredibly
imbalanced court process that has long-term consequences for tenants.
Empirical research in recent years has underscored the effects that
judgments and actual evictions have on tenants and their families, as well as
their abilities to secure safe and affordable housing in the future. 260
To address the ongoing effects of the Lindsey decision, state legislatures
must consider significant reforms of the summary eviction process. First
and foremost, the primacy of the landlord’s claim to possession must be
257. See Super, supra note 11, at 391.
258. Id.
259. See generally Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64 (1972) (holding that Oregon’s
eviction process limiting tenants’ triable issues did not violate the due process clause).
260. See generally Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 202 (discussing empirical data
collected in a study to demonstrate the negative effects of eviction filings and judgements).
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undone. Many, if not most, eviction cases are in actuality about a landlord
seeking payment of a monetary debt, and the immediate remedy for
nonpayment of rent should not be dispossession. Instead, states and courts
should explore procedural and substantive reforms of the summary eviction
process that equalize the positions of the landlord and tenant. Additionally,
states should strengthen enforcement of habitability standards and access to
legal counsel, both of which have been shown to reduce actual evictions.
Eviction is a social scourge in modern American society, and housing
justice can be fully achieved only by challenging and reforming the
summary eviction court process that governs it.
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